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Crossing the Thin Blue Line:
Protecting Law Enforcement Officers
Who Blow the Whistle
Ann C. Hodges and Justin Pugh*
Law enforcement makes headline news for shootings of unarmed
civilians, departmental corruption, and abuse of suspects and witnesses.
Also well-documented is the code of silence, the thin blue line, which
discourages officers from reporting improper and unlawful conduct by
fellow officers. Accordingly, accountability is challenging and mistrust of
law enforcement abounds. There is much work to be done in changing the
culture of police departments and many recommendations for change. One
barrier to transparency that has been largely ignored could be eliminated
by reversal of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Criticism of the decision has been widespread, but its specific consequences
for law enforcement officers who cross the thin blue line remain little
examined in the legal literature. This article begins to fill that gap.
Garcetti held that when public employees speak pursuant to their job
duties, their speech is unprotected by the First Amendment. This boundary
creates a threshold hurdle that employees must meet before they can seek
* Copyright © 2018 Ann C. Hodges and Justin Pugh. Ann C. Hodges is Professor
of Law Emerita at the University of Richmond. Justin Pugh, J.D. 2017, University of
Richmond is Law Clerk, Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia. The
authors thank Mollie Laird and Adam Wall, Class of 2019, University of Richmond for
valuable research assistance.
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protection from retaliation for speech. Garcetti has serious consequences
in the hierarchical environment of law enforcement, removing
Constitutional protection from retaliation for officers who report unlawful
conduct through their chain of command. Reporting through the chain of
command is often required by policy, practice and culture. While the
Garcetti Court suggested that whistleblower laws fill the protection gap
created by the elimination of First Amendment protection for employee
speech, this article demonstrates that such laws do not provide adequate
protection to officers who report, or want to report, corruption and abuse
in their department. To reduce the disincentive to report illegal conduct of
fellow officers, the Supreme Court should return to the Pickering
balancing test. The Pickering test served well for forty years as a means to
both protect public employee speech and give due weight to the
government employer’s need to direct and control its workforce.
Furthermore, the Pickering test eliminates confusion in the lower courts
in deciding when an employee is speaking pursuant to job duties and
better protects the public interest in government transparency. Protecting
internal whistleblowers is essential to prevent and correct government
corruption in law enforcement and elsewhere. While reversing Garcetti
will not solve all the problems created by the culture of silence in law
enforcement, it will eliminate one barrier to reporting misconduct by
reinstating constitutional protection for such reports.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014 Laquan McDonald, an African-American teen, was shot and
killed by a police officer in Chicago.1 One year later a video was
released that contradicted the story of the police officers at the scene.2
The police officer who fired the shots was indicted for murder.3 After
an investigation by a special prosecutor, three other police officers
were charged with conspiracy, official misconduct, and obstruction of
justice based on their reports of the incident.4 The special prosecutor
stated: “The indictment makes clear that these defendants did more
than merely obey an unofficial ‘code of silence.’ Rather it alleges that
they lied about what occurred to prevent independent criminal
investigators from learning the truth.”5
Laquan McDonald, of course, is not the only African-American
killed by police in recent years. More recently, police in Sacramento
shot and killed Stephon Clark in his grandparents’ back yard.6 But the
presence of video has enabled the public to learn much more about
these incidents, documenting a problem that the African-American
community has lamented for years. Why has it taken video? Many of
these shootings have occurred in the presence of other officers. What
prevents other officers from accurately reporting on what has
occurred? One factor might be the well-documented code of silence
among police officers alluded to by the prosecutor in the McDonald
case.7

1 Nausheen Husain, Data: Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video and
the Fallout, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. In addition, the shooting prompted a federal investigation and the removal
of the superintendent of police. Id.
5 Merrit Kennedy, 3 Chicago Police Officers Accused of Cover-Up in Killing of
Laquan McDonald, NPR (June 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/06/27/534596557/3-chicago-police-officers-accused-of-cover-up-in-killingof-laquan-mcdonald.
6 Anita Chabria et al., Updated: ‘Show Me Your Hands.’ Police Video Shows Death of
Stephon Clark in a Hail of Gunfire, SAC. BEE (March 21, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/
latest-news/article206212019.html.
7 The problem of the police officer who wants to do the right thing when faced with
corruption and violence by other officers has been the subject of popular books and
films. See 15 Great Movies About Police Corruption that Are Worth Watching, TASTE OF
CINEMA, http://www.tasteofcinema.com/2015/15-great-movies-about-police-corruptionthat-are-worth-watching/ (describing inter alia Prince in the City from 1981 and Serpico
from 1973, both based on books) (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
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The police union in Chicago supported the officers who made false
statements, although it is unclear what information the union had
about the incident at the time.8 A significant part of the union’s role,
however, is protecting officers from unjust discipline, and unionnegotiated protections may limit efforts to hold officers accountable
for alleged misconduct.9 In fact, protections in the union contract may
even encourage the code of silence.10 In light of these factors,
unionized officers, accurately or not, may perceive pressure to support
and not undermine accused fellow officers.
Another factor is the prospect of reprisals following reports of
official misconduct. Police officers who report malfeasance of other
officers have limited constitutional protection. In 2006, the Supreme
Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos, and therein held that public
employees who speak pursuant to their job duties have no First
Amendment protection from retaliation for that speech.11 Lower
courts have found that application of Garcetti “lead[s] to a vexing
result in the context of police abuse.”12 While the Supreme Court
suggested that whistleblower laws provided adequate substitute
protection, whistleblower statutes do not in fact provide
comprehensive protection for law enforcement officers reporting
misconduct of other officers.13 Accordingly, this article argues that the
Supreme Court should return to pre-Garcetti precedent. Doing so
would protect government employees’ right to free speech under a
fact-specific test that balances the employee’s speech rights against the
employer’s interests in effective and efficient government.14 Having a
8 See Megan Crepeau, Prosecutors Can Use what Officer Van Dyke Told Union Rep at
Laquan McDonald Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-court-met-20170811-story.html\.
In similar cases, the union has also supported accused officers. See Catherine L. Fisk & L.
Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 747-48 (2017).
9 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 736-44. As Fisk and Richardson document,
however, unionization is a response to “managerial neglect and retaliation” as well as
lack of voice and concerns about arbitrary discipline. Id. at 716, 723-26, 736-37. The
authors show that unions can be part of the solution to the problem of police
misconduct and have advanced police reform in some departments. Id. at 759-76.
10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT 14 (2017) https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [hereinafter
CHICAGO REPORT].
11 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
12 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J.,
specially concurring).
13 See infra notes 152-183 and accompanying text.
14 See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (establishing the balancing test now known as Pickering balancing).
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balancing test for free speech offers greater protection for employees
reporting police misconduct, thus reducing the discouraging effect of
the law. In addition, it furthers the public’s interest in holding law
enforcement officers and other government employees accountable for
misconduct. While a return to Pickering balancing is certainly not a
complete solution to the problem of police officers who fail to speak
out about the malfeasance of other officers, it removes at least one
barrier to such speech, opening the door to other approaches to
address the problem.
Part I of this paper examines the roots of the growing furor about
the problem of police misconduct and the need for information to
address the problem. Using examples and analysis, this article suggests
that the most reliable means to get this sort of information is by way of
internal reporting from within law enforcement itself. This article then
examines the current disincentives for such reporting. Specifically,
Parts II–V explore why this sort of disclosure is highly unlikely in the
current landscape. Parts II and III summarize the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework governing protections for public
employee speech under the First Amendment, leading to the Garcetti
case and the problem it poses. Part IV looks at developments in case
law after Garcetti, showing that the case reduced the likelihood that
officers reporting misconduct would be protected from retaliation.
Part V analyzes other protections for public employees to determine
whether they provide an adequate substitute for First Amendment
protection. This article concludes that it does not. Finally, Part VI
suggests a return to the Pickering test as a remedy and a means to
incentivize reporting on matters of great public importance.
I.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE

Laquan McDonald is but one of many unarmed African-American
men shot by police. In August 2014, Michael Brown was shot and
killed in the predominantly African-American suburb of Ferguson,
Missouri. Accounts of the events leading up to the shooting differed,
but the evidence tended to show that Brown was unarmed when he
was shot by a white police officer.15 The shooting kicked off a series of
protests in the town of Ferguson, some of which became violent.16
15 See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is
Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/
ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
16 Hasani Gittens, Shooting of Michael Brown Sparks Riots in Ferguson, Missouri,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-
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Over a period of several months during summer and fall, Ferguson
was the focus of national attention, the frontline for critics of police
brutality and racial inequality, and the birthplace of the “Black Lives
Matter” movement.17
Allegations of police brutality and bias toward minority groups are
nothing new. The pervasive notion that law enforcement treats
minorities differently to their detriment traces its roots back through
the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles in 1991, resulting in riots
after the acquittal of the officers,18 to the Civil Rights Movement in the
1960s and beyond. But for many, the Michael Brown shooting
precipitated a growing appreciation for the plight of minority groups
in their interaction with law enforcement. Persons all across the racial
and ethnic spectrum began to take notice and call for reform. Their
outcry was bolstered by studies suggesting that persons of color were
far more likely to be shot and killed by police officers than whites.19
At the state and local level, empirical evidence abounds supporting
the disparate treatment of racial minorities at the hands of the police.
For example, from January 1995 to December 1997, the Maryland
State Police conducted a voluntary review of traffic stops along the
Interstate 95 corridor.20 The study revealed that “70 percent of drivers
stopped and searched by the police were black, a figure drastically
disproportionate to the estimated 17.5 percent of drivers — and
speeders — who were black.”21 Traffic stop studies in New Jersey,
Louisiana, and Florida presented similar results.22 Elsewhere, studies
conducted by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) following
outcry over “stop and frisk” programs revealed that almost eighty-four
shooting/shooting-michael-brown-sparks-riots-ferguson-missouri-n177481.
17 Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s Shooting, CNN (Aug.
15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-whatwe-know/index.html.
18 Anjuli Sasky & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look Back at
The Rodney King Riots, NPR (April 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/
524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots.
19 See, e.g., US Police Shootings: How Many Die Each Year?, BBC MAGAZINE (July 18,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36826297 (citing a Washington Post
study of news reports that found blacks 2.5 times more likely to be shot by police than
whites); POLICE VIOLENCE REPORTS, http://mappingpoliceviolence.org (noting that
statistics from 2015 and 2016 suggest blacks are three times more likely to be killed
by police than whites) (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
20 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Justice on Trial, Chapter One: Race and
the Police, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG, https://web.archive.org/web/20090614190457/http:/www.
civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/race.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
21 Id.
22 Id.
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percent of the 175,000 “stops” effectuated by NYPD officers between
January 1998 and March 1999 were of blacks and Hispanics.23 This
was despite the fact that those groups constituted less than half of the
city’s population.24 In the wake of the Michael Brown shooting,
statistical analysis of police activity in Ferguson, Missouri revealed
that blacks accounted for eighty-five percent of traffic stops, ninety
percent of tickets, and ninety-three percent of arrests.25 This is despite
the fact that Ferguson is about one-third white.
The reality of widespread racial inequality in policing has been
confirmed by data collected by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).
This comes from DOJ reviews of urban police forces with reputations
for cross-racial conflict. A 2016 DOJ audit of police practices in
Baltimore revealed a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional stops,
searches, arrests, and excessive force effectuated against minorities.
This was coupled with retaliatory practices against those civilians and
police officers that spoke out against misconduct.26 Similarly, a DOJ
investigation into police practices in Chicago — often viewed as the
frontline in the fight for racial equality in policing — disclosed a
pattern and practice of excessive and unreasonable force against
minorities.27
This reality has resulted in a national call for oversight of law
enforcement. In response, police forces at the state and federal level
have taken various actions. These include new training programs,
civilian review boards, and police body camera policies, to name a
few.28 In spite of these practices, concern about lack of oversight for
police officers remains. This concern is exacerbated by the perception
that police officers are protected by a culture that discourages internal
23

Id.
Id.
25 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (data taken
from 2013 to 2015).
26 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2016), http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/
20160810_DOJ%20BPD%20Report-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BALTIMORE REPORT].
27 CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
28 Id. at 6-7; Jasmine Huda, St. Louis’ New Civilian Oversight Board Begins to Accept
Complaints from Citizens, FOX2 NOW, (May 10, 2016) http://fox2now.com/2016/05/10/stlouis-new-civilian-oversight-board-begins-to-accept-complaints-from-citizens/ (describing
new oversight board created in St. Louis in the wake of events in Ferguson); see also St.
Louis, Mo., Civilian Oversight Board, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/
departments/public-safety/civilian-oversight-board/index.cfm (describing the Civilian
Oversight Board and its responsibilities).
24
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reporting and takes steps to insulate itself from legal recriminations. In
colloquial parlance, this is the “Thin Blue Line.” That perception has
been borne out by empirical data, public opinion, and popular culture.
Some of the more shocking anecdotal evidence of the phenomenon
comes from former New Jersey State Trooper Justin Hopson.29 As a
rookie officer, Hopson witnessed an unlawful arrest and falsification of
charges perpetrated by his training officer.30 When he refused to
support the officer’s fabricated version of events, he became the target
of a rogue group of troopers known as the Lords of Discipline
(“LOD”).31 This organization had hazed and harassed New Jersey
officers for years until Hopson’s defiance sparked a massive internal
investigation by the state police.32 The culture of retaliation that
Hopson’s experience suggests has been documented by numerous
studies and surveys of police force reporting across the country.33 In
particular, the Christopher Commission’s inquiry into Los Angeles
police practices suggested that, “[p]erhaps the greatest single barrier
to the effective investigation and adjudication of complaints is the
officers’ unwritten ‘code of silence’ . . . . [the principle that] an officer
does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer.”34
Similar conclusions were reached in studies of police departments
from New York to Louisiana.35
29 JUSTIN HOPSON, BREAKING THE BLUE WALL: ONE MAN’S WAR AGAINST POLICE
CORRUPTION (2011).
30 Id. at 7-15.
31 Id. at 20-29.
32 Id. at 33-45, 74-78, 108, 128-33, 139; see also Thad Moore, Taking on the Blue
Wall, THE POST AND COURIER (May 26, 2012), https://www.postandcourier.com/
features/faith_and_values/taking-on-the-blue-wall/article_cdc1058d-1b45-5f89-b166f85cb626bc66.html (“The experience led to a lawsuit and spurred the largest internal
investigation in the state police’s history.”).
33 E.g., MILTON MOLLEN, THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT 53-58 (1994), https://www.scribd.com/document/248581606/
1994-07-07-Mollen-Commission-NYPD-Report (finding evidence of a “code of
silence” within the NYPD); WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 31 (1991) [hereinafter
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION], https://web.archive.org/web/20110722124708/http://www.
parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20-%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf
(finding a pattern of excessive force as well as a fundamentally flawed reporting
system within the LAPD).
34 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 168.
35 See, e.g., Code of Silence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH n.131, n.133, n.134,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo27.htm (citing, in order, Jeff
Gammage, Code of Silence: A Barrier to Truth in Investigations of Police, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 5, 1996; Susan Finch, NOPD Told to Put Stop to Brutality, TIMES-
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The culture of silence is not limited to rank and file police officers.
Both police unions and departmental management are complicit. A
report from the Police Accountability Task Force in Chicago, where
Laquan McDonald was shot, concluded that “[t]he collective
bargaining agreements between the police unions and the City have
essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”36 According
to the report, the agreements discourage reporting, make it easy for
officers to lie, and require destruction of evidence of misconduct after
several years.37 Similarly, a DOJ report on the Baltimore Police
Department found that the department’s inconsistent responses to
complaints resulted in an unwillingness on the part of officers to
report, particularly in light of the risk of retaliation.38
Regardless of the enterprise, the best way to ensure oversight and
organizational compliance is often through self-reporting.39
“Employees are particularly effective at promoting compliance because
PICAYUNE, May 20, 1993; and Dick Lehr, Department Unwilling to Face Brutal Facts,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1997).
36 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING
TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 14 (2006),
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF-Complete-Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter PATF REPORT]; see also Stephen Rushin, Response to When Police Kill, 22
BERK. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018) at 3-7, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3154036&download=yes (detailing research regarding the
impact of union contracts, civil service rules, and law enforcement officers bills of rights
on the ability of police departments to investigate and hold officers accountable for police
violence); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1240-43 (2017)
(arguing based on study of 178 police collective bargaining contracts that contractually
required disciplinary procedures limit police accountability).
37 PATF REPORT, supra note 36.
38 BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 26, at 128 (“BPD does not consistently classify,
investigate, adjudicate, and document complaints of misconduct according to its own
policies and accepted law enforcement standards.”).
39 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (“[G]overnment employees
are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work . . . .”); see also Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 375 (2005) (noting that in passing SarbanesOxley, Congress recognized “the enormous regulatory potential” in encouraging and
protecting whistleblowers); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation:
An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 363-64 (1997) (noting the potential of
individual and industry self-regulation to effect compliance with normative social
values); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (recognizing that prosecutions
for public corruption often depend on the testimony of fellow government
employees); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 80-82 (2004) (recognizing the public
interest in receiving information from public employees); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public’s interest in
receiving such information is no less when the employee’s speech is pursuant to job
duties).
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of their placement and ability to detect unlawful behavior.”40 Courts
and legislatures have long recognized this fact, consistently reaffirming the importance of statutes protecting whistleblowers from
retaliatory employment action.41 These sorts of protections often
intertwine, overlap, and supplement protections for public employees
supplied by the First Amendment. However, over the course of the last
two decades, First Amendment protection for public employees has
been eroded by Supreme Court precedent, leaving a void. This void
chills self-reporting, strengthening the thin blue line. The modern
public interest in oversight of police practices merits a re-examination
of the current approach to protection for government employee speech
under Supreme Court jurisprudence.
II.

THE PICKERING TEST

For nearly forty years, the Constitutional free speech rights
guaranteed to public employees by the First Amendment were
delineated by a balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board of
Education.42 In 1964, Marvin L. Pickering, an Illinois teacher, wrote a
letter to the editor of his local newspaper.43 Like many of his fellow
citizens, Pickering was concerned with the machinations of the
District 205 Board of Education.44 In the years leading up to
Pickering’s letter, the Board had attempted to pass several pieces of
local legislation — namely bond proposals and tax hikes aimed at
raising funds for two new schools in the district.45 The letter criticized
the Board for its allocation of resources between academic and athletic
programs, and alleged that the superintendent of schools was
suppressing dissent from teachers with respect to the funding issue.46
In response to his letter, the Board dismissed Pickering from his
position.47 Pickering challenged the dismissal as a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.48 In 1968, his case came before the
United States Supreme Court.49 It would go on to become a watershed

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Nancy M. Modesitt, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 155 (2011).
Id. at 154-56.
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 564
Id. at 566.
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id.
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case in Constitutional employment law, defining the First Amendment
rights of public employees for decades to come.
The Pickering Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall,
held that Pickering’s letter to the editor was speech protected by the
First Amendment and that the Board’s subsequent dismissal was
unlawful.50 The touchstone of the analysis, for Justice Marshall, was
the idea of “public concern.”51 Drawing on a rich history of First
Amendment jurisprudence, the Pickering Court held that, “statements
by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First
Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are
directed at their nominal superiors.”52 Ultimately, Pickering came to be
known for its efforts to balance the rights of the public employee, who
is also a citizen, against the rights of the public employer.53 The socalled “Pickering balancing test” spawned out of these efforts.
Under this balancing test, a court first examines whether the
challenged speech entails a matter of public concern.54 This is based
on an inquiry into its content, form and context.55 Then, if it is
satisfied that a matter of public concern is implicated, a court proceeds
with a rigorous, fact-specific balancing of employer and employee
interests.56 Furthermore, under the balancing test, the court will assess
the context in which the dispute arose.57
For several decades, this balancing approach controlled First
Amendment speech claims brought against public employers. The
Pickering test remained largely unchanged until 2006, when Richard
Ceballos arrived before the Supreme Court, alleging that his employer,
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, had unlawfully
50

Id. at 574-75.
Id.
52 Id. at 574 (citing Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) and Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
53 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of [a public
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 158
(1983) (applying the Pickering test to discharge of the Assistant District Attorney).
54 Id.
55 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”).
56 Id. at 150-54 (“The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the
government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to
the public.”).
57 Id. at 153.
51
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disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment rights.58 In
addressing the merits of his case, the Supreme Court sounded a retreat
from the Pickering balancing test and, in doing so, erected a high
barrier between public employees and their First Amendment
retaliation protections.
III. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
In early 2000, Richard Ceballos, an Assistant District Attorney in
Los Angeles County, was asked by a defense attorney to review the
affidavits supporting a crucial search warrant in a pending criminal
case.59 The defense attorney was concerned about potential
misrepresentations or inaccuracies and appealed to Ceballos in his role
as calendar deputy to investigate further.60 Ceballos examined the
affidavit itself, visited the location it described, and spoke with the
warrant affiant on several occasions.61 He determined that, in his
opinion, the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations and
recommended that the case be dismissed.62 Ceballos memorialized all
of this information in memoranda to his supervisors in the District
Attorney’s Office.63 In response to Ceballos’s concerns, his supervisors
arranged a meeting with representatives from the sheriff’s department
to discuss the affidavit.64 According to Ceballos, discussions at the
meeting were intense and a lieutenant criticized Ceballos for the
manner in which he dealt with the case.65 Despite the issues Ceballos
raised, his superiors pursued the prosecution.66 Ceballos was called as
a witness by the defense and testified about his observations and
opinions regarding the search warrant.67 Following this ordeal,
Ceballos alleged that he suffered several adverse employment
consequences — reassignment, transfer to another courthouse, and
denial of a promotion as a result of engaging in protected First
Amendment speech.68

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 415.

2018]

Crossing the Thin Blue Line

13

The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy,
held that Ceballos’ reports to his superiors did not constitute speech
protected by the First Amendment.69 In so doing, the Court
reconceived the strictures of the Pickering balancing test. Specifically,
the Court established a threshold question for public employees
challenging adverse employment action on First Amendment
grounds.70 Under Garcetti, a court’s first task is to determine whether
the employee’s challenged conduct occurred pursuant to official job
duties.71 If the speech is pursuant to job responsibilities, “the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”72 This principle serves as a categorical bar to
relief under the First Amendment and precludes application of the
Pickering balancing test.
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Criticisms of Garcetti
Almost since its inception, scholars and researchers have recognized
the inconsistencies in the Garcetti holding and the difficulties that it
presents in terms of application.73 First, and foremost, among these
69

Id. at 424-26.
Id. at 426; Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014) (“In Garcetti, we
described a two-step inquiry into whether a public employee’s speech is entitled to
protection: ‘The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment
cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.’” (quoting
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418)); Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 701-03 (9th
Cir. 2009) (describing the findings of various circuits that whether the employee
spoke as an employee is a threshold question in First Amendment cases after
Garcetti).
71 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“The First Amendment protects some expressions
related to the speaker’s job . . . . when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”).
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099, 2120 (2016) (criticizing restrictions on the speech of
government lawyers); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the
Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 209, 226-29 (2008) (criticizing application of Garcetti to school employees);
John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the Unanswered and Related
Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 243, 246 (2017) (arguing
70
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criticisms is the allegation that Garcetti creates an “artificial
dichotomy” between a public employee in the role of citizen and in
the role of employee.74 In the abstract, this distinction is both “false
and unprecedented,”75 relying as it does on the dubious principle that
only speech “as a citizen” is protected by the First Amendment. This
principle does not appear anywhere in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.76 Nor does it comport with the Court’s recognition of
“corporate speech” as a category of conduct protected by the First
Amendment.77 At the same time, this dichotomy results in the logical
inconsistency recognized by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Garcetti,

Garcetti should be overruled); Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Employment Law:
Zimmer’s Intuition on the Future of Employee Free Speech Law, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 393, 415 (2016) (discussing ‘“reason-specific protections” and the limiting of
free-speech rights by Garcetti); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First
Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 143-44
(2009) [hereinafter Garcetti’s Impact] (criticizing application to the speech of federal
employees); Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, ABA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 529 (2010) (analyzing the chain-ofcommand analysis versus the assigned-responsibilities analysis, and finding the latter
more consistent with Garcetti); Jason Zenor, This Is Just Not Working for Us: Why after
Ten Years on the Job - It Is Time to Fire Garcetti, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 101, 123
(2016) (analyzing Garcetti and arguing “[t]he [Supreme] Court should have refocused
the emphasis of the employee speech doctrine back toward whether or not the speech
was a matter of public concern”). Some scholars, however, are less troubled by the
case. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 659-60 (2012) (arguing public employee
speech has “low First Amendment value” due to a general governmental inability to
make “context-sensitive judgments about the quality of speech or its social
appropriateness”).
74 See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really Public
Employees? In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 92, 96
(2008) (noting that once an individual is employed it is difficult to immediately
separate their speech into two distinct categories of “citizen” and “employee”);
Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 123 (rejecting the “dichotomous, overly-formalistic
view of a public employee as either being a citizen or worker, but never
simultaneously both”).
75 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2D
335, 340 (2006).
76 See id.
77 See id. (“The fact that the corporations are not citizens did not matter because it
is the right of listeners, according to the Supreme Court, that is paramount.”); see also
Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“The
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”).
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namely that “it is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly
the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.”78
In practice, the dichotomy has produced inconsistent results.
Several subsequent cases illustrate the problem. In Morales v. Jones, the
Seventh Circuit held that a police officer’s conversations with his
superiors concerning an arrest were part of the officer’s job duties and
thus outside the purview of First Amendment protections.79 At the
same time, the court concluded that statements stemming from the
same arrest, when made at a deposition for the purposes of a section
1983 action80 were not part of the employee’s job duties and merited
protection.81 In Jackler v. Byrne, the Second Circuit concluded that a
police officer’s failure to make a false statement at the behest of his
superiors did not amount to performance of job duties.82 And yet, in
Huppert v. City of Pittsburgh, the Ninth Circuit held that a police
officer’s grand jury testimony concerning corruption within the
department83 was employee speech and could not serve as the basis of
a section 1983 claim for retaliation.84
With respect to testimony in court, in Lane v. Franks, the Supreme
Court found that employee Lane’s testimony in a former employee’s
trial on corruption charges was protected by the First Amendment.85
The Court emphasized, however, that the job of a director of a
community college program did not involve testifying in court.86 In
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, he highlighted the narrow scope of the
majority opinion. Specifically, he noted that the Court did not answer
the question of how testifying affects public employees, such as police
officers, whose job duties indeed include testifying in court.87 In
78

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427.
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007).
80 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
81 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) (showing 42 U.S.C. §
1983 expressly creates a private right of action to enforce constitutional claims arising
“under color of state law”).
82 Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 234, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2011).
83 It is worth noting that both statutory law and department policy compelled the
officer’s truthful testimony. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 707-09 (9th
Cir. 2009).
84 Id. (overruled by Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013)). Although
Huppert was later overruled, that fact does not sufficiently mitigate the problems
created by Garcetti. Id.; see also infra notes 126-151, 193-218 and accompanying text.
85 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379-80 (2014).
86 Id. at 2378-79.
87 Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).
79
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finding the speech protected, the Court did emphasize the significance
of the fact that Lane’s testimony was about public corruption, stating:
[i]t would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to conclude
that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption
by public officials — speech by public employees regarding
information learned through their employment — may never
form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim. Such a
rule would place public employees who witness corruption in
an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify
truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their
jobs.88
It might be argued that this language should bring comfort to police
officers considering speaking out about public corruption. Several
factors, however, lead to the opposite conclusion. First, an officer
must bring corruption to the attention of someone in authority before
it can be prosecuted. Depending on the circumstances, such speech
may be unprotected yet bring retaliatory action long prior to any
possibly protected testimony. Second, as noted above, the concurrence
suggested that police officers might have less protection for testimony
than other employees.89 And finally, Lane actually lost his claim
challenging his termination by Franks because of his testimony. The
Court concluded that the law regarding speech protection for
testimony was unclear at the time of Lane’s termination and therefore,
Franks had qualified immunity.90
The only practical differences between the holdings in these postGarcetti cases are the audience to whom the putatively protected
speech was delivered, and the job descriptions and duties of the
employees. In this respect, Garcetti produces results divorced from
one of the key concerns highlighted by Pickering and its progeny: the
public’s legitimate interest in being apprised of misconduct or areas of
contention within their representative government. In fact, the
Garcetti Court itself explicitly recognized this interest, conceding “the
importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the wellinformed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion.”91 This is the entire purpose of the “public concern”
88

Id. at 2380.
Perhaps an officer might be able to claim that testimony about fellow officers’
unlawful conduct is not part of her job even though she regularly testifies in court for
other purposes. This seems a slim reed on which to risk retaliation and job loss.
90 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381-83.
91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
89
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inquiry that characterizes the Pickering test.92 And yet, Garcetti
subverts this interest and subjects the issue of public concern to a
restrictive and wholly arbitrary dichotomy that produces inconsistent
and illogical results.
Along similar lines, Garcetti has faced criticism for failing to provide
guidance to courts on how to properly differentiate between employee
speech and citizen speech in the context of public employment.93 The
Garcetti Court gave lower courts no workable schema for answering
this question. It suggested that official job duties and descriptions,
while possibly illustrative, did not end the inquiry, and further
cautioned that courts should be hesitant to construe a public
employee’s job duties too narrowly.94 This lack of guidance has
produced myriad approaches in the lower courts.
Here, it will also be helpful to look at a few practical examples. The
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on the issue focuses on the
identification of “civilian analogues.”95 The inquiry hinges in large
part on whether the employee’s challenged conduct can properly be
analogized to some form of citizen speech. Thus, in Weintraub, a
teacher’s complaint about classroom disorder, which took the form of
an employee grievance with the union, was not protected because
there was no civilian analogue to a union complaint.96 Conversely, in
Jackler, a police officer’s refusal to give false evidence had a civilian
analogue because a citizen has “the right to reject governmental efforts
to require him to make statements he believes are false.”97 Whether or
not one agrees with the logic of these decisions, it is quite evident how
far afield the analysis has gone from the limited instructions provided
in Garcetti.
Other circuits put dispositive weight on the chain of command,
consistently holding that public employees who report concerns to
their supervisors are not insulated from retaliatory employment
action.98 In Davis v. McKinney, the Fifth Circuit addressed
92

Id.
Paetzold, supra note 74, at 97.
94 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25.
95 See, e.g., Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229, 241 (2011) (finding speech
protected by the First Amendment because it had a “civilian analogue”); Weintraub v.
Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York, 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d. Cir.
2010) (holding that petitioner had no First Amendment protections as his “filing of
[a] grievance was in furtherance of one of his core duties as a public school teacher,
maintaining class discipline, and had no relevant analogue to citizen speech”).
96 Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198.
97 Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241.
98 See Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Forraker v.
93
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communications from an internal auditor regarding the financial
solvency of the University of Texas.99 The court concluded that those
communications that went up the chain of the command did not merit
protection under the Garcetti framework.100 In Dahlia v. Rodriguez, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the case of a police officer who reported
internal misconduct to his superiors and later to an Internal Affairs
Department.101 The court noted that the chain-of-command analysis
employed by the Fifth Circuit was enlightening but not dispositive.102
The court went on to highlight three guiding principles by which it
would decide this case and others going forward: the chain of
command, the content of the employee communication, and the
orders or directions of the employer (including whether or not the
employee complied).103 The focus on the chain of command may be
particularly problematic for police officers, who work in a quasimilitary hierarchical organization.104 Workplace and social norms
encourage internal reporting, and the culture in a military-like
organization is even more likely to encourage, if not require, reporting
in the chain of command.105
Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that troopers’ complaints to a
State Auditor were adequately within the chain of command and thus not protected by
the First Amendment); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an officer’s communications with a state senator and inspector general regarding
sexual harassment did not involve the chain of command, as her job duties did not
involve contacting either, and thus constituted First Amendment protected speech);
Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding an employee’s
act of notifying her supervising officials about signs of fraud and inaccuracies was not
protected free speech as it was pursuant to official responsibilities).
99 Davis, 518 F.3d at 307-09.
100 Id. at 315-16. Consider the consequences of applying this sort of approach to a
case like Jackler. In Jackler, a police officer made a report of misconduct to his
superiors but was disciplined for failing to alter the report to provide false
information. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241. Would the Davis v. McKinney test bar recovery?
The report was made pursuant to Jackler’s job duties, as a departmental directive
required officers present during use of force to file a report. Thus, under the standard
chain-of-command analysis the report is not protected. One could also argue that the
order to change the report also renders the speech pursuant to job duties. This case
could be analogized to Garcetti where the calendar deputy wrote a report about a
search warrant’s reliability with which his supervisors disagreed.
101 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074-75.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1074-76.
104 See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 722 (“Police departments are
hierarchical, with a chain of command as in the military and a sharp division between
the leadership and the rank-and-file.”).
105 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 159-60 (highlighting that for reasons of
confidentiality and social cohesiveness, reporting within the chain of command is
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These differing approaches between the Circuits to resolving
questions of law are not catastrophic problems. At the very least,
however, they evince the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme
Court in answering the citizen-employee speech question. But, it is
important to recall the Garcetti framework and the stage of the
analysis at which these approaches arise. Garcetti imposes a threshold
issue for the analysis of public employee free speech. Thus, when a
court uses one of the above approaches, and arrives at the conclusion
that a public employee spoke as an employee, that ends the analysis
and the employee’s recovery is barred. In this respect, the myriad
approaches delineated above serve as barriers or hurdles, precluding
access to Constitutional rights based on wholly arbitrary doctrinal
constructs.
Finally, Garcetti has faced opposition on policy grounds from those
who assert that its holding chills employee speech on matters of public
concern.106 This shortcoming is particularly relevant in the context of
modern law enforcement, where the importance of oversight is
heightened. The primary concern in this respect is that Garcetti
discourages police officers from reporting misconduct or impropriety
up the chain of command. And yet, bizarrely, Garcetti extends
enhanced First Amendment protection to officers who go public with
their accusations.107 If the interest of a public employer in having “a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and
actions”108 is so compelling, why incentivize employee disclosure to
outside enterprises? Again, this is especially damaging in the context
of law enforcement, where there is already a culture of hostility toward
officers who report on department misconduct. Officers who blow the
whistle on their counterparts or report impropriety to an Internal
Affairs department are often branded “disloyal” and shunned by the
department at large.109 A study conducted on the Los Angeles Police
often mandatory).
106 See Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 143 (concluding that “federal employee
free speech claims [will] continue to suffer an unjust fate in this post-Garcetti world”);
McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 73, at 219-24, 228-30 (detailing cases of school
employee whistleblowers and showing that they are less likely to be protected from
retaliation after Garcetti and citing various critics of the discouraging effect on
reporting government misconduct).
107 Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 125-27.
108 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
109 See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 90 (D. Mass. 2000)
(finding plaintiff police officer subjected to retaliation and adverse employment action
where superiors believed he had reported misconduct to state investigative agencies);
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Department in response to several high-profile instances of police
misconduct discovered that the department routinely retaliated against
“disloyal” officers by transferring them to unappealing posts far away
from their homes.110 The practice was known as “freeway therapy.”111
The application of Garcetti in this context makes it far less likely that
misconduct or impropriety in law enforcement will be reported to
superiors. And, because most of those who report wrongdoing report
internally first,112 discouraging such reports makes any report
unlikely.
B. Police Officer Cases Pre- and Post-Garcetti
A review of cases involving police officers before and after Garcetti
confirms that the problems identified with the Garcetti holding have
manifested themselves in the context of law enforcement. In general,
officers in cases after Garcetti were more likely to lose their cases if
they reported internally, while they were more likely to at least survive
summary judgment if they reported externally.113 By way of contrast,
pre-Garcetti cases focused on different factors.
Before Garcetti, several factors surface in the cases as important in
the determination of whether the speech of law enforcement officers
warranted protection. The claims that failed tended to fall into one of
several categories. First, some officers who revealed confidential
information to the public in ways that impeded the ability of the police
Walton v. Safir, 122 F. Supp. 2d 466, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding plaintiff police
officer subjected to close scrutiny and adverse employment action where she spoke
out publicly about racial bias in her former unit); Cochran v. City of Los Angeles, 222
F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (cataloguing numerous instances of stigma and
retaliatory action directed at officers of the LAPD who reported misconduct or
cooperated with superiors).
110 Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545,
583 (2001).
111 Id.
112 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 159; What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers and
the Ceballos Decision: Hearing Before the Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of Stephan M. Kohn, National Whistleblower Center) [hereinafter
Kohn] (showing most successful whistleblowers before Garcetti reported the problem
internally first to their supervisor through the chain of command and the report
typically related to their job duties); Will Kramer, Inside the Whistleblower’s World,
WISC. LAW. Vol. 91, No. 3 (March 2018), available at https://www.wisbar.org/
NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=91&Issue=3&Article
ID=26212#a (citing research by the Ethics Resource Center indicating that 92% of
whistleblowers initially reported malfeasance internally).
113 See infra notes 119-151 and accompanying text.
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department to function effectively or served in a confidential capacity
lost their claims because the department’s interest in effective
operation outweighed the employee’s speech interest.114 In other cases,
employees failed to prevail because their motives in speaking were
personal, or even spiteful.115 Another factor that doomed some preGarcetti cases is the lack of a reasonable factual basis for the officer’s
speech.116 Officers who reported police misconduct through the chain
of command, or other appropriate channels, without any such
delimiting factors found their speech protected by the First
Amendment.117 In some cases, even reporting allegations outside
official channels was found to be protected.118
In contrast, after Garcetti the cases frequently turn on whether the
report was made through the chain of command or to an outside
agency or internal affairs department. Courts that protect reports to
outside agencies reason that such speech is not part of the employee’s
job duties. In Spalding v. City of Chicago an officer was protected when
he reported to the FBI because it was an outside law enforcement
agency, and the report was made on his own initiative while he was
off-duty.119 Another officer was protected after he spoke to the FBI
114 See, e.g., Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
disruptive effects of reading of high level officer’s letter at a public meeting
outweighed her free speech rights); Lytle v. City of Hayesville, 138 F.3d 857, 865, 867
(10th Cir. 1998) (finding disruptive effects of external reporting using confidential
information outweighed employee’s speech interest); Moore v. City of Wynnewood,
57 F.3d 924, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding demotion of officer permissible based
in part on department’s interest in controlling the speech of its employees when they
purport to speak for the department).
115 See, e.g., McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 196-98 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding spiteful motive rendered speech about suspected wrongful conduct
unprotected).
116 See, e.g., Lytle, 138 F.3d at 867 (finding speech unprotected where the officer
had little factual support for his allegations against other officers).
117 See, e.g., Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reversing summary judgment after holding an officer’s complaints to the
Department’s Major Crimes Task Force as potentially protected speech); Hare v. Zitek,
414 F. Supp. 2d 834, 855-58 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding police officer’s speech about
departmental corruption protected and not outweighed by employer’s interests where
he reported to the State’s Attorney’s Office’s public integrity unit).
118 Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769, 772-74 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding jury
verdict in favor of officers who directed their attorneys to publicize their allegations of
illegal wiretapping after reporting to superior officers).
119 Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 898-99 (N.D. Ill. 2016); cf.
Griffin v. City of New York, 880 F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding a
training manual’s broad description of an officer’s duties did not restrict plaintiff’s
First Amendment protection as “it ‘would effectively curtail all [NYPD officers’] right
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because he did so without the knowledge or permission of anyone else
in the department.120 However, an officer is not protected when it is
her duty to speak. This can happen when her department orders her to
report to, or cooperate with an internal affairs or outside agency.121
Other cases rely on the connection with job duties or the
expectations of the employee. For example, the Seventh Circuit ruled
against an officer who reported to her supervisor and the Internal
Affairs Department that a fellow officer verbally abused her. The
holding was based on the expectation that she report such incidents,
particularly in a police department, where violent behavior poses a
risk to the public and protecting the public is part of the officer’s
job.122 The court went on to say that the report was “intimately
connected” with her job duties.123
Similarly, a police officer who reported to her superiors misconduct,
corruption and abuse of suspects by fellow officers was deemed
unprotected because she had “an official duty to report unlawful
activity as well as misconduct.”124 The court went on to state that the
officer “did not engage in communicating information of a concern to
the general public as a private citizen but rather reported misconduct
pursuant to her official duties as a police officer.”125 This case
[] to speak out about corruption, thereby discouraging whistleblower activity that is of
great benefit to civil society’” and thus finding report to Internal Affairs protected).
120 Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2016) (reversing district
court’s decision that speech was unprotected); see also Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d
1060, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding report to outside agency protected but report
to supervisors unprotected).
121 See, e.g., Kasprzycki v. DiCarlo, 584 F. Supp. 2d 470, 476 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding report to internal affairs about missing money unprotected because the
reporting police officer was told to report by his employer); cf. Griffin v. City of New
York, 880 F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that a manual indicating that
all officers have a duty to report misconduct did not eliminate First Amendment
protection for report to internal affairs.)
122 Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2016). The court
also noted that she was protecting the work environment. Id.
123 Id. at 482.
124 Hunt v. City of Portland, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1274 (D. Or. 2010), aff’d, 496
F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2012), and aff’d, 599 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2013). The court
pointed to both the city’s rules requiring reporting of misconduct and the general duty
to enforce the law. Id.
125 Id. at 1275; see also Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner, 848 F.3d 576, 580-81,
585 (4th Cir. 2017) (where the court found that the police chief was protected by
qualified immunity because it was not clear that two police officers were speaking as
citizens rather than employees where they visited an arrestee who was reportedly
abused by another officer at his home in plainclothes on their lunch hour, providing
him a complaint form and urging him to file a complaint against the officer).
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illustrates the Catch-22 for police officers. They are obligated to report
yet not protected from retaliation, at least on First Amendment
grounds.126 And as the next section will illustrate, other protections
are insufficient to fill the void.
In a particularly problematic decision, Davis v. City of Chicago, the
Seventh Circuit withheld First Amendment protection from a
municipal employee charged with investigating allegations of police
misconduct.127 As a supervisor in Chicago’s primary police oversight
agency, the Independent Police Review Authority (“IPRA”), Lorenzo
Davis was tasked with reviewing complaints levied against Chicago
police officers, to determine whether the complaints had merit.128
Davis’s findings were memorialized in a formal report, which
summarized the allegations against the police and reached a
conclusion on their validity.129 Davis alleged that between 2014 and
2015, his supervisors at IPRA began pressuring him to “change
‘sustained’ findings of police misconduct and to change his reports to
reflect more favorably on the accused officers.”130 When Davis
repeatedly refused this instruction, he was terminated.131
Davis brought suit, arguing, inter alia, that he had been
unconstitutionally terminated for exercising his First Amendment
rights.132 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of
Davis’s constitutional claim. Applying Garcetti and its own interpretive
precedent, the court concluded that Davis, by virtue of his subordinate
position within the departmental hierarchy, “was responsible for
revising his reports at the direction of his superiors.”133 As such, the
court reasoned that when Davis refused to perform these revisions at
the behest of his superiors, “[his] refusal was pursuant to his job

126 See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J.,
specially concurring) (noting the Catch-22).
127 No. 16-1430, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 11985 (7th Cir. May 8, 2018). It is perhaps
telling that this case arose in Chicago, where the Laquan McDonald shooting
occurred.
128 Id. at *1-2.
129 Id. at *2.
130 Id. at *3. After investigating allegations of misconduct, the IPRA makes
disciplinary recommendations that summarize the investigation and include findings.
The report will state whether the allegations were found to be “sustained,” “not
sustained,” “exonerated,” or “unfounded.” Id. at *2.
131 Id.
132 Id. at *4.
133 Id. at *5.
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duties” and therefore, “he spoke as a public employee rather than a
private citizen.”134
Davis provides still more empirical evidence of two major issues
discussed thus far. First, Davis once again illustrates the contours of
the thin blue line phenomenon woven throughout the precedent on
this subject. And yet, Davis should give more pause than any of the
cases examined to this point. In Davis, the thin blue line is not just a
collection of officers laboring under a communal instinct for selfpreservation. Instead, here we see the thin blue line rendered at a
higher level of abstraction, fully entrenched within the municipal
policy of a major U.S. city. A far-reaching policy such as this
implicates an even greater degree of public concern than does the
typical law enforcement case arising under Garcetti. It is even more
disappointing to see the analysis of conflicting interests subverted by
the Seventh Circuit’s rigidly formulaic reliance on formal job duties at
Garcetti’s threshold step.
Second, Davis presents another example of a court struggling under
the arbitrary and false dichotomy imposed by Garcetti, and the
inconsistent and illogical results this struggle produces. In almost the
same breath, the court both invokes Garcetti’s admonishment that the
analysis of an employee’s job duties involves more than just a written
job description, and simultaneously proceeds to dispose of the case on
the basis of Davis’s job description as defined by Chicago’s Municipal
Code.135 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Davis is
inconsistent with other leading cases. For example, it would be fair to
wonder how Davis squares with the Second Circuit’s holding in Jackler
v. Byrne.136 That case, as discussed supra, involved an officer who
“refused to make false statements of fact in an investigation of a
civilian’s complaint that another officer had used excessive force.”137
In granting the officer relief, the Second Circuit held that the police
department lacked “authority to coerce or intimidate its employees to
engage in criminal conduct by filing reports that are false in order to

134

Id.
Id. at *4-5 “Davis was responsible for revising his reports at the direction of his
superiors. Indeed, Chicago’s Municipal Code assigned the power to make disciplinary
recommendations to IPRA’s Chief Administrator, not a mid-level supervisor. Chi., Ill.,
Municipal Code § 2-57-040(h).” Id. at *5.
136 658 F.3d 225 (2011).
137 Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Jackler, 658
F.3d at 230-31).
135
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conceal wrongdoing by another employee or to conceal eyewitness
corroboration of civilian complaints of such wrongdoing.”138
Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Davis recognizes this inconsistency
with its own holding. It offers only this tepid justification: that Jackler
involved an officer’s refusal to make false statements of fact, while
Davis alleged that his termination stemmed from his “refusing to
accept his boss’s different evaluations of facts.”139 Assuming arguendo
that this distinction carries any legal import, this line of reasoning
demonstrates just how far afield the Garcetti inquiry has led the lower
courts. Instead of balancing the interests of employer and employee
with an eye to keeping the public informed on matters of great
importance, this court was persuaded by a dubious, semantic
distinction between facts and evaluations of facts. The Constitution
demands better.
Finally, two Ninth Circuit opinions, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg140
and Dahlia v. Rodriguez141 further illustrate the struggles of the courts
to apply Garcetti. In Huppert, the officer alleged several First
Amendment violations. He cooperated with the District Attorney in an
investigation of the Public Works Department and later investigated
police department corruption.142 Because he was assigned to both of
these investigations, his speech was deemed unprotected, even though
he was instructed to stop the latter investigation by one supervising
officer while told to continue by another.143 His third claim was that
he reported corruption in his department to the FBI on his own time
and without any departmental orders.144 Nevertheless, the court found
that his job duties included investigation of corruption and therefore
any speech to the FBI was unprotected.145 Finally, he claimed
retaliation based on his grand jury testimony about police department
corruption but the court found that testimony before grand juries
138

Jackler, 658 F.3d at 242.
Davis, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 11985, at *7.
140 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
141 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
142 Huppert, 574 F.3d at 703-06.
143 Id. at 705-06.
144 Id. at 706-07.
145 Id. at 707. The court relied on California case law holding that the duties of a
police officer include crime prevention, crime detection, and disclosure of any
information relating to criminal activity. Id. As a result, the court concluded that the
fact that he engaged in the speech on his own volition and own time was not
determinative, id., although similar facts led to a determination in Spalding, that the
speech was citizen speech. Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 898-99,
905 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
139
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about corruption was expected of police officers and therefore the
testimony was unprotected speech.146
Four years later, the Dahlia court reversed Huppert, criticizing the
court for failing to make a “‘practical’, fact-specific inquiry” into the
job duties of the officer.147 The Dahlia court found that the Huppert
court properly used the “‘practical’ inquiry” to find the cooperation
with the District Attorney and continuation of the corruption
investigation unprotected, but failed to properly apply the test to the
speech to the FBI and the grand jury.148 Applying its test to the
officer’s speech in Dahlia, the court found that his report up the chain
of command about abuse of witnesses and suspects was unprotected
employee speech.149 With respect to the allegations that the officer
suffered retaliation for speech about the abuse to the Internal Affairs
Department, his union, and an outside agency, the court reversed the
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.150 However, the
court left open the possibility that his duties might include these
reports, depending on what was revealed in discovery.151
These two cases reveal the difficulties in distinguishing employee
speech from citizen speech. Additionally, they show that it is common
in cases involving police officer reports of corruption and abuse for
complaints to be made to various entities. This results in a
commingling of the two types of speech defined in Garcetti, thereby
confusing the issues even further for employers, courts, and
employees. If there were truly other protections for employees that did
not raise these same issues, the application of Garcetti would not be as
concerning. But as the next section demonstrates, other laws do not
provide the protection that law enforcement officers need.
V.

OTHER PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Before Garcetti, the First Amendment was understood to provide the
“ultimate whistleblower protection”152 by insulating public employees
from retaliation. With this protection largely gutted by Garcetti, all
146

Id. at 707-08.
Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
148 Id. at 1070-71.
149 Id. at 1076.
150 Id. at 1077-78.
151 Id. Dahlia will be discussed further infra to assess how the Pickering framework
improves the analysis of police officer cases. See infra notes 193-218 and
accompanying text.
152 Joel Gora, First Amendment Decisions in the October 2005 Term, 22 TOURO L.
REV. 917, 926 (2007).
147
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that remains to shield public employees are statutory remedies. In fact,
the Garcetti majority noted this fact and contended that whistleblower
laws at the state and federal level were sufficient to protect employees
from adverse employment action.153 This is a dubious contention.
The whistleblower laws are rife with gaps in protection. As is
evidenced by post-Garcetti case law,154 reporting the misconduct of
other police officers internally will often be considered part of an
officer’s job duties. It may be explicitly required by an employee
handbook or job description, or may be inferred because their job is to
enforce the law.155 Of course, this is the problem with Garcetti, but the
problem is also present in many whistleblower statutes.156 The federal
Whistleblower Protection Act was amended in 2012 to cover
employees making reports as part of their job duties.157 While that is a
positive development, the application to police officers is not yet clear
and, in any event, most police officers are employees of state and local
governments. Many state whistleblower statutes do not contain
explicit protection for “internal/official duty whistleblowers”158 and
some have been interpreted to exclude them from protection.159
The coverage of whistleblower statutes varies widely, resulting in
exclusion of some law enforcement officers altogether. For example,
some state statutes do not cover employees of subdivisions like
municipalities or counties, thereby excluding many police officers.160
153

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006).
See supra notes 119-151 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
156 According to research by the National Whistleblower Center following the
Garcetti decision, only fifty-eight percent of states protected “internal, official-duty”
whistleblowers. Kohn, supra note 112, at 5. Some states have since expanded coverage
of their laws. See infra note 158.
157 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(A), (G)(2) (specifying protection for disclosures made
to supervisors and disclosures “made during the normal course of duties of the
employee.”); Jason Zuckerman, Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for
Federal Employees, ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FLASH (Nov.-Dec. 2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/1212_abalel_
flash/lel_flash12_2012spec.html.
158 Kohn, supra note 112, at 17-18. A few states have interpreted their statutes to
protect internal/official duty whistleblowers since 2006. See, e.g., Igwe v. City of
Miami, 208 So. 3d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d
215 (N.J. 2015) (finding protection for such employees); Brown v. Mayor of Detroit,
734 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Mich. 2007).
159 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 168-76 (discussing increasing number of
employers in state whistleblower cases asserting an exception to protection for
internal/job duties whistleblowing and courts in several states that have adopted the
exclusion).
160 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-102(3)
154
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Additionally, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently dismissed the
claim of a state employee under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act,
holding that the legislature did not have the authority to waive the
state’s sovereign immunity from suit.161
Other states have specific requirements for coverage that may not be
met where the employee has no knowledge of the technical
requirements for protection. For example, in Alabama, the disclosure
must be made under oath or by affidavit,162 while in Delaware the
report must be made to an elected official, including employees of the
office of the elected official.163 Similarly, Florida requires that the
report be made to the Chief Executive Officer of the local government
or “other appropriate official.”164 Just who is an “appropriate official”
has been the subject of litigation, with the Florida District Court of
Appeals stating “the protection extends to disclosures to members of
boards, committees, departments, or divisions affiliated with the
offending governmental entity, so long as the board, committee,
department, or division has the authority to investigate, police,
manage, or otherwise remedy the violation or act by the violating
governmental entity.”165 Does this include the police officer’s
supervisor? A higher level official within the police department?
A police officer who wishes to report police misconduct is unlikely
to be aware of such nuances. The appropriate time to report may be
immediately after an incident occurs, or perhaps as part of a mandated
report. This gives little time to consult with any knowledgeable
adviser.
Other states’ whistleblower statutes have different technical
requirements for coverage. This can include a mandated initial
disclosure to the employee’s supervisor in order for protection to
attach,166 or a requirement that the report be in writing.167 In these
(2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-1, 4 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-2973 (2010).
161 Arkansas Community Correction v. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122 (Apr. 12, 2018).
162 See ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (1975).
163 See DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit. 29, § 5115 (1995). This seems unlikely to include
superior officers in the police department. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-173 (1999)
(requiring disclosure to a state investigative body).
164 See FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(6) (2002).
165 Rustowicz v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 174 So. 3d 414, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
166 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (2006) (with limited exceptions, protecting
disclosures to public bodies only if the employee first discloses to a supervisor in
writing and provides the employer with an opportunity to correct the problem); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2006). This mandate, if followed, would likely eliminate
protection under the First Amendment because such a report would likely constitute
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states, the police officer whose supervisor is part of the problem or the
officer who makes an oral report may be unprotected. And while some
states have exceptions to the requirement of an initial internal report,
the officer may be unable to ascertain in advance whether the
exception applies.168
In addition to confusing and problematic technical requirements,
ninety-five percent of state laws provided fewer remedial or procedural
protections than would be afforded by the First Amendment.169 These
differences may discourage reporting as well for those who consult
with knowledgeable advisers before taking action.
Federal law also has specific requirements that may be difficult to
satisfy in a typical case. Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, case
law requires “an employee complaining of retaliation to show
irrefutable proof that the person criticized was not acting in good faith
and in compliance with the law.”170 Moreover, federal employees are
not protected in the case of “statements of facts publicly known
already.”171 In a given situation, whether a disclosure meets these
requirements may be difficult to ascertain in advance.
All of this contributes to the picture painted by Justice Souter’s
dissent of a “patchwork” system of protection for public employees,
“not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for
relief.”172 Close examination reveals that protections for public
employee whistleblowers are a far cry from “the powerful network of
legislative enactments . . . available to those who seek to expose
wrongdoing.”173
As for police unions, they have been identified as both obstacles to
reform and agents for reform.174 Typically, union membership
employee speech. See Kohn, supra note 112, at 6; cases cited supra notes 122-126, 149
and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.90.110(c) (2010) (allowing employer to require
a report in writing to the employer prior to reporting a matter of public concern under
the statute with limited exceptions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.341 (2017).
168 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-103 (2013) (dispensing with the requisite
supervisory report if the individual reasonably believes it will not correct the problem
but then requiring report to the agency head or the office of the governor).
169 Kohn, supra note 112, at 6.
170 Public Employees, 2 Manual on Employment Discrimination § 10:16 (citing
Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
171 Id. (citing Francisco v. Office of Personnel Management, 295 F.3d 1310, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
172 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440 (2006) (Souter J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 425.
174 See generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8 and sources cited therein.
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provides an expressive conduit for the rank-and-file police officer so
often suppressed by the police department’s rigid, hierarchical
structure.175 Union representation gives officers an outlet to air
grievances and participate in policymaking that would not otherwise
exist.176 However, union representation may in fact impede reform
efforts by providing categorical protection to officers who engage in
misconduct or improper police practices.177 For example, police union
contracts often “contain provisions that protect officers accused of
misconduct, shield them from civilian oversight, and limit the ability
to change officers’ conditions of employment, which also makes it
difficult to enact reforms such as setting up early warning systems.”178
These provisions offer protection not only to officers who engage in
misconduct, but also to officers who report misconduct, potentially
shielding them from unjust discipline. Yet, given the culture of silence
that is typical of police departments and the systemic problems of
police violence,179 it seems unlikely that officers who are breaking the
code would rely on their unions for protection. It is always
challenging for unions to handle cases involving conflicts between
members when they have a duty to represent all members fairly.180
And, where there is strong organizational pressure to protect fellow
officers and union officials are elected, their incentive to support the
whistleblower reporting a fellow officer is reduced.181 Further, while
the union contract may insulate the individual officer from adverse
employment consequences based on reporting misconduct, it is not a
substitute for First Amendment rights and protections.
Few other legal protections exist for officers retaliated against for
reporting police misconduct.182 As a result of Garcetti, “public
175 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 726-28 (“[P]olice officers responded to . . .
[a] hierarchical and punitive supervisory structure by forming unions.”).
176 Id. at 738-40, 759-66.
177 See id. at 717-18 and sources cited therein.
178 Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
179 See Chemerinsky, supra note 110, at 573-75 (describing the culture of silence in
the Los Angeles Police Department); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and
Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 495-507 (2004) (describing a systemic
culture of violence in many police departments).
180 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 715.
181 Id. at 715, 748.
182 If an employee’s whistleblowing complaints involved complaints of violation of
state or federal statute, the employee might have a retaliation claim under the
particular statute alleged to be violated. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting
discrimination for opposing unlawful practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
or for filing a charge of discrimination or participating in an investigation of
discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (same regarding Age Discrimination in
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employees now enjoy only the types of protections that private
employees enjoy for their undesirable workplace speech.”183 This is a
dramatic step back from the protections afforded in the wake of
Pickering.
VI. A RETURN TO PICKERING
As the previous sections have demonstrated, Garcetti is excessively
restrictive and creates a substantial chilling effect on public employee
speech. This is particularly true in the context of law enforcement.
The solution is a return to the Pickering test that controlled these
disputes until the decision in Garcetti.
In effect, this is the approach suggested by Justices Stevens and
Souter in their dissenting opinions in Garcetti.184 Justice Souter’s
opinion in particular highlights the problems with the majority’s
framework, many of which have been examined in detail in the above
sections, as well as the benefits of returning to the more lenient
strictures of the Pickering test. The fallacy of the arbitrary dichotomy
of citizen-employee speech, the subversion of the public interest in
effective governance, and the inadequacy of statutory remedies for
protecting public employees who express dissent all require a return
to the Pickering balancing test without the Garcetti gloss. A return to
the Pickering test would alleviate many of these concerns.
First of all, the Pickering test is desirable in that it removes the
arbitrary and fallacious distinction between employee and citizen
speech. No longer would lower courts be forced to fashion arbitrary
decisions governing what constitutes employee speech and what
constitutes citizen speech. At the same time, removing that forced
distinction would allow for the possibility, contemplated in some case
law but largely unexplored, that citizen speech and employee speech
are often inextricably linked.185
Additionally, a return to the Pickering test would place the focus of
the inquiry once again on the public interest in governmental
Employment Act).
183 Paetzold, supra note 74, at 108.
184 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the case should have been decided in accordance with the precedent set by
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979), with no
examination of employee-citizen speech); id. at 427-29 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing for application of the Pickering test).
185 See, e.g., Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging “mixed” speech cases but dividing them into individual
communications); see also Paetzold, supra note 74, at 97.
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disclosure. This public interest has been subverted by the Garcetti
threshold question, which renders otherwise protected speech a valid
pretext for retaliatory employment action, thus discouraging
employees from reporting improper or unlawful conduct. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that the root of Pickering and its
progeny was:
the recognition that public employees are often the members
of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as
to the operations of their public employers, operations which
are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to
speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of
informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at
stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed
opinion, as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.186
If this is indeed the case, the Garcetti Court’s willingness to remove
cases from judicial scrutiny before even reaching the Pickering test is
perplexing. Furthermore, as examined above, the alternative remedies
for the employee are so deficient that Garcetti can be a substantial
barrier to the goal of a well-informed public.
Proponents of the Garcetti holding argue that it provides essential
assistance to public employers in maintaining discipline and efficiency
in the workplace.187 This is undoubtedly the case, but we should be
concerned with how far we are willing to go to satisfy this end,
especially when fundamental Constitutional rights are at stake. As
Justice Souter so eloquently put, “when constitutionally significant
interests clash, resist the demand for winner-take-all; try to make
adjustments that serve all of the values at stake.”188 Where the public
interest in disclosure is great, the employer should not be able to
defeat protection solely because the employee had a duty to disclose or
spoke in her role as employee. If the employer can show substantial,
or in some cases even potential,189 disruption to government
operations, the employer can still prevail under Pickering.
Garcetti supporters also posit that a return to the Pickering test
without any threshold question would lead to a flood of litigation in
the courts.190 This argument suggests that by implementing a less
186

San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (citation omitted).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23.
188 Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983) (part of the speech in question
“carries the clear potential for undermining office relations”).
190 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
187
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restrictive test for First Amendment protections, the judiciary would
open itself to fielding countless frivolous suits on behalf of jilted
public employees. This argument ignores several important facts. First
of all, the Pickering test was the controlling law in this arena for almost
forty years and in that time, the Court saw no need to drastically alter
the framework in response to any flood of litigation.191 Moreover, as
noted above, the Pickering test does not necessarily amount to more
freedom for public employees. It simply assures that the interests of
the employee-citizen will always be accounted for, even if that
accounting ultimately weighs in favor of the government.
Should pure Pickering balancing be deemed overly disruptive to the
government, Justice Souter’s formulation offers another solution to the
problem. He argues not for a return to the Pickering test in all cases,
but a willingness to balance interests where an employee “speaks on a
matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of
responsibility in the way he does it.”192 This “Pickering test plus”
approach seems almost tailor made to suit the growing need for
oversight in the context of law enforcement. When a law enforcement
officer speaks out on police misconduct or the impropriety of
department policies, the officer would satisfy the “unusual
importance” analysis. And, an officer reporting to his superiors would
satisfy the second prong of the analysis, requiring “high standards of
responsibility.” No longer would courts be required to deny protection
to the officer who goes up the chain of command, as his employer
would surely prefer and may actually require, while protecting the
employee who blows the whistle publicly. Apart from removing this
inconsistency, the Pickering-plus approach would give the public a
chance to get what it so desperately craves: law enforcement willing to
cross the “Thin Blue Line.”
At this point, it will be beneficial to look at the practical application
of the proposed Pickering-plus balancing test. Justice Souter’s
dissenting opinion never carried the force of law, so there are no
exemplary cases on point. However, let us endeavor to play the role of
federal judges and apply the Pickering-plus test to a real factual
scenario, taken from the Dahlia case discussed earlier.
The facts of Dahlia are appropriate for this purpose because they
encapsulate much of what is wrong with both police culture and the
191 See id. at 435 (“[P]rotection less circumscribed than what I would recognize has
been available in the Ninth Circuit for over 17 years, and neither there nor in other
Circuits that accept claims like this one has there been a debilitating flood of
litigation.”) (Souter, J., dissenting).
192 Id.
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judicial systems designed to monitor it. In Dahlia, the plaintiff-officer
was assigned to work a large robbery case with several other officers
from his department.193 Almost immediately upon being assigned to
the case, Dahlia began witnessing incidents of excessive force and
improper interrogation tactics perpetrated by his fellow officers.194 In
response, Dahlia went to his immediate supervisor and reported the
misconduct.195 Dahlia’s supervisor told him to “stop his sniveling” and
took no action, despite two more complaints made by Dahlia and
another officer.196 Following these reports, the offending officer,
Rodriguez, became suspicious of Dahlia and made efforts to cut him
out of the investigation.197
That suspicion increased when Dahlia met with his Internal Affairs
division on several occasions.198 Dahlia began receiving threats and
harassment from Rodriguez and another officer on an almost daily
basis, in an effort to ensure that he did not report any misconduct to
Internal Affairs.199 On one occasion, Dahlia was called to a nearby park
on the pretext of an emergency situation and arrived to find only
Rodriguez and another officer present, the two of whom attempted to
intimidate him into revealing what he said to Internal Affairs.200
Following this incident, the department received word that the FBI
might be looking into the robbery investigation and the actions of the
investigating officers.201 At this, Rodriguez called Dahlia into his
office, displayed his gun in a menacing fashion and told Dahlia that if
he continued reporting on the investigation Rodriguez would fabricate
criminal charges against him.202 Dahlia subsequently reported this
incident to his local police union and, ultimately, to the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department.203
As an initial matter, Dahlia provides excellent anecdotal evidence of
the “Thin Blue Line” phenomenon. Dahlia bore witness to gross
misconduct on the part of his fellow officers. Instead of being
applauded for disclosing the truth, he faced harassment and censure
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1064-65.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
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from within his own department. What is worse, he had very little
recourse within the hierarchy of the police department. Dahlia
suffered an intolerable working environment for months until he was
ultimately disciplined for doing what he knew to be right.
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit mentioned several considerations
that underlie the Garcetti citizen-speech inquiry. The court then
divided Dahlia’s complaint into the individual incidents of speech —
per Connick204 — that were alleged: (1) Dahlia’s report to his
immediate superior, (2) Dahlia’s meetings with Internal Affairs, (3)
Dahlia’s report to his local union, and (4) Dahlia’s report to the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department.205 Following the dictates of Garcetti and
its own interpretive precedent, the Ninth Circuit concluded on the
first point that Dahlia’s report to his supervisor occurred within the
chain of command and thus did not merit protection under the
Garcetti framework.206 Regarding the second incident, the Ninth
Circuit held that Dahlia’s meetings with Internal Affairs might be
protected speech, although Dahlia may not have disclosed any
misconduct for fear of reprisals.207 While the Court expressed
concerns that Dahlia did “precisely what his superiors wanted him to
do — that is, meet with IA but stay mum,” which the court indicated
would render his speech unprotected. Yet it also recognized that
drawing all inferences in Dahlia’s favor, as required on a motion to
dismiss, Dahlia had stated a claim worthy of First Amendment
protection.208 Regarding the third incident, the court was again
concerned with Dahlia’s explicit job duties, but found that at the
motion to dismiss stage, Dahlia’s disclosure to his union was
protected.209 Similarly, with respect to the fourth incident, the court
expressed skepticism about whether Dahlia would be required to
report to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, but ultimately
concluded that this incident survived the Motion to Dismiss.210 The
standard of review is important here. The Dahlia court made clear
throughout the opinion that Dahlia was entitled to a favorable
inference at the Motion to Dismiss stage and that it was this inference,
not any sort of compelling legal case, that allowed Dahlia to prevail.211
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983).
Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1076-78.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1077-78.
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Again, we should pause and examine the inherent flaws of the
Garcetti framework as applied to Dahlia’s case. This decision makes
clear the tendency under Garcetti to focus on the wrong sort of
inquiries. Instead of emphasizing the balance between employeeemployer rights, informed by public interest, the Dahlia court was
consumed with inquiries into whether or not Dahlia’s reports were
made pursuant to his official job duties. Even though three of Dahlia’s
reporting incidents ultimately survived the Motion to Dismiss, the
court was clearly skeptical that Dahlia could prevail at trial under the
Garcetti framework. There is, at the very least, a good possibility that
none of Dahlia’s communications would merit protection under
Garcetti. And, if disclosures to a superior, Internal Affairs, a local
union, and an outside law enforcement agency are not protected, what
recourse is there for the police officer who witnesses misconduct? Is
he to suffer the indignity of threats and harassment at his job,
knowing all the time that he had a chance to stop the corruption? The
Dahlia court seems to suggest that a report wholly outside the chain of
command and not directed by supervisors would be protected under
Garcetti. But again, this raises a question as to the purpose of the test.
If the concern is the interests of the employer, there is no reason to
create a test that encourages public whistleblowing as the only route
to potential protection from retaliation. Certainly, such disclosure
would serve to inform the public, but it would also create precisely the
sort of unstable and ill-disciplined government work force that
Garcetti sought to prevent. Further, under the Pickering balancing test
a court may find that such outside reporting is sufficiently disruptive
to justify any adverse action directed at the employee. The officer
could win the battle but lose the war.
Now, consider how Dahlia would have been decided under the
Pickering-plus test. As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit’s severance
of Dahlia’s complaint into four separate “communications” or
“incidents,” squares with Supreme Court precedent under Connick,212
but it may not be necessary under the Pickering-plus test. For the sake
of comparison, however, the analysis will preserve the Ninth Circuit’s
analytical framework. Looking at the first communication, Dahlia’s
report to his supervisor meets the two requirements for balancing
under Pickering-plus. First, misconduct by police officers involving
use of force against civilians is indisputably a matter of “unusual
importance” to the public, especially in light of the national cry for
police oversight. Second, Dahlia’s decision to report to his direct
212

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.138, 147-49 (1983).
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superior — also the officer in charge of the investigation — complied
with high standards of professional responsibility. As a result, we can
proceed to balancing the interests of the employee against the interests
of the employer. Dahlia clearly has a compelling interest in not being
complicit in unlawful police practices and also in avoiding the rigors
of a hostile work environment. At the same time, the police
department has little to no interest in precluding this sort of
communication as it does not disrupt the workplace in any form.
Thus, a court would likely find that First Amendment protection
applies, and any adverse action taken against the employee in
retaliation for the speech would be unconstitutional.
Looking at the other three communications, there is a strong case
for balancing in each.213 The most interesting of the three, for
balancing purposes, is Dahlia’s report to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department. Here, Dahlia’s employer has a case for prevailing on the
balance because Dahlia’s disclosure to an external agency does
implicate the department’s ability to properly maintain efficiency and
compliance. The outcome will likely depend on how the outside
investigation was initiated, how Dahlia came to testify, and whether
the employer can show actual or potential disruption in the
department as a result. These facts are not revealed by the
complaint.214 At the very least, this demonstrates that balancing under
Pickering does not automatically amount to a victory for the
employee.215
The outcome under Pickering-plus squares more properly with the
interests that we have considered thus far and removes some of the
inconsistencies inherent in the Garcetti framework. For example, the
outcome under Pickering-plus removes the incentive for the employee
to report outside the chain of command.216 There is no way to be
213 There is certainly an argument that Dahlia’s report to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department did not comply with high standards of professional responsibility in that
he reported to an external agency. The complaint before the court did not indicate
whether his report was made on his own volition or at the direction of is employer.
Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1077-78. If the former, this fact implicates the employer’s interest
in maintaining a stable and efficient workforce, and weighs in the employer’s favor at
balancing. The fact that no outside report would have been necessary if the employer
had acted in response to Dahlia’s initial report to his supervisor should weigh on
Dahlia’s side of the balance. Id. at 1063-64.
214 Id. at 1077.
215 In fact, Pickering-plus likely preserves some of the Garcetti framework’s
preference for employer interests in that it considers the employer’s interest at the
initial stage and again during traditional Pickering balancing.
216 There has been some suggestion that if the public concern is a paramount
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certain, of course, that the employee’s report will be treated seriously
or result in a policy change but, at the very least, the employee will
have a remedy if subjected to adverse employment action. And if
disclosures to several internal organizations — Internal Affairs and the
police union in the Dahlia example — are not sufficient to address a
problem, then the corruption at issue is probably so systemic and
structural that employee speech may be simply insufficient as a
remedy.217 But at least the test offers protection from retaliation for
public employees who do the right thing.
Moreover, the Dahlia example makes clear the Pickering-plus test’s
capability to represent all relevant interests in the case. The public’s
interest is vitiated at the initial stage — by way of appeal to matters of
“unusual importance” — and again at the Pickering balancing test. The
employer’s interest is also represented at the initial stage — via the
high standards of professional responsibility requirement — and again
at the Pickering balancing stage. And, of course, the employee’s
interest is validated in the balancing test itself. This recognition and
respect for the interests of all involved parties is preferable to the
Garcetti framework’s preclusion of balancing based on the arbitrary
and false citizen/employee speech dichotomy.
Applying regular Pickering balancing to the facts of Dahlia leads to
the same result. There is no requirement that the speech be on a
matter of “unusual importance” to the public or that it be raised in a
highly professional manner. The speech need only be on a matter of
public concern. That determination is made based on the context of
the speech. Abuse of suspects and witnesses by police officers reported
to superiors, the Internal Affairs Department, and ultimately to an
outside investigating agency certainly meets that test. Then balancing
occurs, with the employee’s speech interests balanced against the
employer’s interests in managing the workforce. The factors in the
balance will be the same under either test. While this test does not
contain the preliminary requirements that take into account the
interests of the employer and the public, the public concern
requirement, present in both tests does provide a check that insures

interest then we should incentivize disclosures outside the chain of command. While
this may be a compelling rhetorical argument, it miscasts the problem. The public’s
real interest is in removing and deterring police misconduct, and the best way to
accomplish this goal is by incentivizing efficient, internal reporting and prohibiting
adverse employment complications.
217 Incidentally, whistleblowing on structural corruption like this would almost
certainly satisfy the “bad faith” requirements of federal whistleblowing laws. See supra
note 170 and accompanying text.
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that the subject of the speech indeed concerns the public interest and
is not merely a private dispute between the employer and employee.218
A return to Pickering balancing, with or without the enhancements
suggested by Justice Souter, will not solve the problems of police
shootings of unarmed citizens, abuse of suspects and witnesses, or
departmental corruption. It will, however, remove one barrier for
officers who want to do the right thing and truthfully report identified
problems in policing. While retaliation may occur, the officers will
have a more potent remedy, which may encourage some to come
forward. An altered legal test would not have saved Laquan McDonald.
But perhaps the truth about Laquan McDonald’s shooting would have
surfaced earlier. Perhaps there would have been fewer necessary
indictments of officers. Perhaps officers will think twice about
engaging in unlawful conduct if the gaps in remedies for truth-telling
are replaced by gaps in the thin blue line.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the Garcetti test for First Amendment
protections in public employment has proven problematic. The test is
difficult to apply, removes incentives for public employees to disclose
government misconduct, and robs the public of internal government
oversight. Recent developments in the field of state and federal law
enforcement have rendered these drawbacks particularly damning.
The growing demand for oversight in the realm of law enforcement
necessitates a retreat from Garcetti. Instead, the Court should adopt
either the standard Pickering balancing test or the Pickering-plus
approach advocated by Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent. Both tests
allow a court to consider all the relevant interests implicated by a
public employee’s First Amendment claim: the interest of the
employee, the interest of the employer, and the interest in maintaining
transparent government and a safe and informed public. Moreover,
these approaches offer a simple balancing test that courts can
understand and apply, rather than the arbitrary and false dichotomy
created by Garcetti. Most importantly in this time of civil unrest,
Pickering balancing presents an opportunity to cross the “Thin Blue
Line.”
218 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49, 154 (1983) (finding questionnaire
distributed to coworkers after employee transfer largely concerned the employee’s
own interests and to the limited extent that it raised a matter of public concern, the
employee’s speech interest was outweighed by the employer’s interest in avoiding
office disruption).

